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Abstract
In this thesis, I designed and tested a supervisory control scheme for the Odyssey
II-class Autonomous Underwater Vehicles that relies on a very-low-data-rate acoustic
communication link. A human supervisor communicates with the AUV over a combi-
nation radio/acoustic network. The supervisor radios commands from shore to data
repeater nodes moored at strategic locations on the ocean surface. Utility Acoustic
Modems mounted on the moorings rebroadcast the binary data into the sea in the
12-17 kHz frequency band. The moving AUV detects the transmission, decodes the
message, and carries out the command contained within. The operator's commands
are implemented in the context of a behavior-based layered control software archi-
tecture. The supervisory control scheme was tested and verified during the Synaptic
Internal Tide Experiment, which took place in Monterey Bay during August and
September, 1999.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Working with the Odyssey II AUV
The Odyssey II underwater vehicle is a second-generation survey-class autonomous
robot designed for use as an intelligent mobile instrument platform [4]. It is an
extremely robust and successful design, with over 400 dives in field deployments since
1992 in Antarctica, the Arctic, the Juan de Fuca ocean ridge in the Pacific Northwest,
the Haro Straits off of British Columbia, Monterey Bay, New Zealand, the Labrador
Sea, Massachusetts Bay, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf of Mexico.
1.1.1 Vehicle Hardware
Housed in a low-drag fairing with a single propeller and cruciform control surfaces,
the Odyssey II AUV is 2.2 meters long (see Figure 1-1). It has a maximum diameter
of 0.6 meters, and a maximum speed of about 3.5 knots. The fairing is free-flooded
and contains the main pressure housings, which are two glass spheres. In the present
configuration, the vehicle has an endurance of eight to twelve hours, depending on
the operating speed and the usage of the various power-consuming subsystems, such
as the acoustic modem.
The primary onboard computer is built around a Motorola 68030 microprocessor.
In addition to the main computer, a network of small micro-controllers is used to
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Figure 1-1: The Odyssey II AUV.
distribute "intelligence" to sensors and actuators. In its present state, the vehicle
sensor complement includes a three-axis gyrocompass, three-axis accelerometer and
angular rate sensors, an altimeter, and a pressure transducer. Scientific sensors and
instruments include conductivity and temperature sensors, an acoustic doppler cur-
rent profiler, a Utility Acoustic Modem (UAM) from WHOI, and a hydrophone and
source for acoustic communications1 .
Vehicle operators may use an acoustic transponder, a radio beacon, or a strobe
to locate the vehicle. All three locating aids operate from power sources independent
from each other and from the rest of the vehicle electronics, to ensure operation
even if the vehicle batteries are low. Operators use the radio beacon and strobe for
locating the vehicle on the surface, and can track the vehicle under water using an
ultrashort-(USBL) Trackpoint II system from a support ship.
1.1.2 Operational Problems
This thesis is motivated partly by operational failures that the Sea Grant team ex-
perienced during the Odyssey-class vehicles' many field deployments. While these
'Please note that the UAM source and receiver are now located in different positions on the
vehicle.
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vehicles have had, in general, superlative operational records, Murphy's Law strikes
every project sometime, and MIT Sea Grant is no different. Interviews with experts in
the unmanned vehicle (UV) field and reviews of MIT Sea Grant Post-Cruise Report-
s highlight potentially serious operational failures associated with errors in mission
programming, inadequate hardware checks, subtle low-level programming errors, and
ordinary bad luck. The following accounts of UV failures were taken from MIT Sea
Grant Post-Cruise Reports [14, 15], personal correspondence [1, 2, 13, 19, 25, 28, 29],
and conference papers [24]:
" An error during mission programming led to the grounding of the MIT Sea
Grant vehicle Xanthos off the island of Elba, Italy.
" The tail cone section of one of the Odyssey vehicles was damaged and replaced
with the tail cone from another vehicle. Diagnostic tests seemed to indicate
satisfactory elevator/rudder operation but failed to reveal a reversal in motor
wiring which reversed rudder and elevator commands. Upon release and sub-
mersion, the vehicle foundered at the surface for the duration of its one-hour
long mission.
" A combination of a software fault and a jammed weight release mechanism
caused the Autonomous Benthic Explorer (ABE) to get stuck on the sea floor
at a depth of 4100 meters. Recovery was accomplished without further mishap
by Deep Sea Vehicle Alvin [30].
* A combination of a subtle low-level programming error combined with insuffi-
cient pre-launch checks resulted in the near-loss of the AUV Amphitrite on the
bottom of Monterey Canyon in 700 meters of water. Recovery was accomplished
by the Remotely-Operated Vehicle (ROV) Ventana.
" A waypoint entered incorrectly during the mission-planning phase sent a Remote
Environmental Monitoring UnitS (REMUS) swimming optimistically for New
Jersey, 300 miles away. A quick mission abort and a second inspection of the
mission plan revealed the error.
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* An incorrect value for the local magnetic variation led to a minor 29 degree
offset in REMUS heading. (Note: Must have been an incorrect sign. That's
about twice the value of the local mag. var.)
The vehicles that survived the problems listed above (ABE, REMUS, Odyssey)
all are robust systems, built by experienced, skilled engineers and scientists. Yet,
they were each vulnerable to the same system deficiency - once launched, the vehicles
were isolated from all but the most rudimentary contact and control. Interaction was
limited to acoustically triggering a weight release to force the vehicle to the surface,
or other single-use systems. The simple fact is, even though each of these vehicles has
made progress toward the goal of reliable, autonomous operation, no machine can be
as smart or adaptable as a human. To achieve the most out of "autonomous" systems,
we must provide the ability for humans to intervene when the necessity arises.
The ability to observe and intervene in the course of an otherwise automatically-
controlled process is often called supervisory control. The goal of this work is to use
an acoustic communication link to implement a supervisory control capability for the
Odyssey II AUV. With such a capability in place, the character of operations would
shift from the current "fire and forget" regime to a much more interactive relationship
between human operator and AUV.
1.2 Supervisory Control
A long-time expert in the field, T. B. Sheridan describes supervisory control in the
following way [23]:
"In the strictest sense, supervisory control means that one or more
human operators are intermittently programming and continually receiv-
ing information from a computer that itself closes an autonomous control
loop through artificial effectors and sensors to the controlled process or
task environment."
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He describes a spectrum of control, with manual control (in which the human
operator makes continual adjustments in an attempt to control a process) at one
end, and fully automatic control (in which the human is merely an observer, and
a computer controls the process through actuators and sensors) at the other. In
the middle lies a continuum of supervisory control in which the human operator
and a computer share varying levels of responsibility in the control of a process or
accomplishment of a task.
The original designers of the Odyssey II AUV strove to place the vehicle as far
toward the automatic end of that spectrum as possible. In some sense, they succeeded
- humans only interacted with the vehicle at the beginning and end of its mission.
During the sometimes lengthy missions (as long as six hours), the operators could
track the AUV with an acoustic pinger, but, if an emergency arose, there existed
no robust capability for human intervention. Vehicle operators need the ability to
intervene when they see indications that the automatic controller cannot cope with
a developing situation. Consider the following scenario, in which the AUV is below,
conducting hydrographic surveys, and the weather on the surface is quickly deteri-
orating. Not knowing how long the storm might last, perhaps the only way for the
operators to guarantee the survival of the vehicle would be to command it to the sur-
face immediately. Without this ability, the ship's crew is at the mercy of the storm,
forced to attempt a dangerous recovery in unforgiving conditions when the vehicle
surfaces at the end of its mission.
1.2.1 System Requirements for Supervisory Control
Classical control theory predicts that time delays in a feedback control loop can
incite potentially disastrous instabilities (try staying in the same lane by looking at
the painted road lines only as they pass in your rear-view mirror!). In the sixties, as
part of research into the problem of how operators on earth could manipulate robots
on the lunar surface through the three-second round trip time delay imposed by the
speed of light, researchers showed that remote manual manipulation was safe only by
operating in a "move-and-wait" fashion [9]. The operator would command as large
14
a movement as possible without risking collision or other error and then wait three
seconds (one round-trip time delay) for feedback about the result of his command.
The delay forced operators to perform maneuvers in small increments, making even
simple tasks unacceptably (but unavoidably) time-consuming and tedious.
Solving the Delay Problem
In more modern systems, advances in actuators, sensors, software, and computer
processors have made it possible to remove humans from the step-by-step details of
control. Now, operators can issue more abstract, less-frequent, goal-oriented com-
mands that a semi-intelligent subordinate system then carries out. In the case in
which the computer that closes the subordinate control loop is collocated with the re-
mote device, there is no delay, and thus no instability. The operator, though remote,
can review the progress of the task, revise commands, and step in as needed.
Of course, this scenario cannot eliminate the signal propagation delay between the
operator and the vehicle computer, nor does it address communication bandwidth
requirements. Specific calculations of the maximum allowable delay and required
bandwidth are directly affected by the dynamics of each system, but we may use the
following criteria as basic guidelines [23]:
1. The operator's command should encompass a relatively large "bite" of the task
at hand. Thus, the operator's intervention in the control loop can be at a much-
reduced frequency compared with that of the subordinate automatic controller.
2. The unpredictable aspects of the remote environment must not change too
rapidly (the environment should have a sufficiently low disturbance bandwidth).
If the operator can trust that his next image of the remote environment will
look much like his last, then he can plan future actions farther in advance. This
is the principle behind the "move-and-wait" method of remote manipulation.
3. The subordinate automatic system should be trustworthy. If the subordinate
automatic controller's response to disturbances is robust, more responsibility
for the minute-to-minute survival of the system can be transferred to it by the
15
human operator. Assuming a sufficiently controllable vehicle, a well-designed
proportional-derivative controller can mitigate the dangers of an unpredictable
environment.
1.2.2 Using an Acoustic Communication Link for Superviso-
ry Control
Acousticians have studied underwater digital communication for many years, and low
data rate acoustic telemetry (up to 100 bits per second in benign environments) has
been available since the early1990s. With the emergence of high-speed, low cost DSP
chip sets in the early 1990s, Datasonics Inc. (of Massachusetts) and researchers at
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) produced a commercial acoustic
modem that could deliver 1,200 bits per second in a half-duplex communication link.
The system could be used in either a deep-water, vertical channel or a shallow-water,
long-range environment with severe multipath interference [20].
To those readers used to hearing about 56 kilobaud modems and 10 mega-bit-
per-second internet connections, these data rates may seem to be incredibly slow.
However, this is the reality of underwater acoustic communication; because of the
severe attenuation of radio-frequency waves in water, bandwidth limitations are un-
avoidable for applications requiring even a modest transmission range.
State of the Art
To reduce data errors, use bandwidth and energy more efficiently, and to increase
the data transfer rate, researchers have focused on two modulation techniques - one
involving phase coherent demodulation, and the other non-coherent demodulation.
The two schemes have widely different performance characteristics, and the choice
depends on the requirements of the environment and the application.
Phase coherent demodulation techniques offer high data rates (higher than 10,000
bits per second without coding) and excellent bandwidth efficiency, and greatly reduce
the transmission time of the data stream [11]. Coherent demodulation is usually
16
implemented through the use of Quadrature Phase Shift Key-ing (QPSK), which
requires the receiver to detect both the magnitude and phase of the received signal.
Its principal disadvantages are increased processing complexity and cost, and it is
most suited for situations that can offer a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) - i.e. for
short ranges, high source levels, and low ambient noise levels.
Systems that are implemented using non-coherent demodulation techniques offer
more reliable transmission, are very resistant to noisy environments and multipath
interference, and are easier to implement and deploy, resulting in lower development
cost; however, they are limited to much lower data rates. Currently, the maximum raw
data rate for commercially-available systems is 2,400 bits per second [7]. Error coding,
transmission redundancy, packet delays, and power limitations lower the effective data
rate (actual data through-put) even more. Depending on the acoustic environment,
the effective data rate can range from 10 bits per second to 2,400 bits per second.
Non-coherent demodulation techniques are typically implemented using a Multiple
Frequency Shift Key-ing (MFSK) approach, and are generally used when ambient
noise levels are high, longer communication ranges are required, or communication
link reliability is very important.
Finally, work is ongoing to adapt and develop other modulation techniques for
underwater digital communication - Sequence Position Modulation (SPM) is an ex-
tension of Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) that permits co-channel, asynchronous,
multiple access to a single receiver. Sanchez et al. [21], describe work in which an
SPM modem is shown to provide acceptable link quality at 160 bits per second at a
relatively noisy 0 dB signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) in a non-minimum-phase multi-path
channel of 5 kHz bandwidth and with a delay spread of 84 milliseconds. This work
could be significant, especially for enabling multiple-vehicle operations in littoral and
surf-zone waters, a research area of significant contemporary interest and practical
significance (underwater mine counter-measures).
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1.2.3 Current Uses of Acoustic Command and Data Links
While the expected transmission delays for underwater acoustic communication are
comparable to or slightly greater than those in earth-to-moon situations, the data
transfer rates are much slower. In spite of this obstacle, engineers and scientists have
made significant progress in using underwater acoustic communication links for data
telemetry and supervisory control.
Subsea Teleoperation with JASON
Subsea Teleoperation with JASON One example of the effective use of acoustic com-
munication for supervisory control can be found in work done by Sayers et al. [22].
They investigated the feasibility of using an acoustic communication link to perfor-
m telemanipulation tasks (grasping) with the JASON ROV. In 1994, the researchers
performed experiments with a simulated acoustic link in which an operator in Pennsyl-
vania performed manual grasping tasks with the ROV deployed off of Massachusetts.
For simplicity, they assumed that the acoustic link had a bandwidth of 10,000 bit-
s per second, perfect reliability (i.e. no breaks in communication, no errors) and a
selectable delay of 5, 10, and 15 seconds. Good results were obtained, suggesting
that tasks traditionally performed via manual control (i.e. with high bandwidth, low
delay communications) can be accomplished with the appropriate tradeoffs between
message size, frequency, and level of abstraction.
Acoustically-Controlled UUV - Hugin
Hugin The Hugin Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) is a product of the Nor-
wegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), which developed the vehicle for high-
precision deep-water seabed mapping [27]. While the Hugin vehicle has some degree
of autonomy, FFI designed it to be continuously supervised and controlled by an
operator on a support ship through an acoustic link [26].
The Hugin vehicle uses three acoustic links; the first is a low data-rate command
link (55 bits per second, without encoding) with FSK modulation, the second is a
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dedicated one-way data link (1,400 bits per second) for real-time data quality control,
and the third is an emergency bi-directional acoustic link that operates through the
acoustic positioning system [18].
1.3 Current Work
The focus of this work is to use an underwater acoustic link to implement a supervisory
control capability for the Odyssey II AUV. This goal was met, with advances in the
following areas:
" Designed a high-level command language to provide a wide range of capabil-
ities to the operator. Special attention was paid to efficient use of available
bandwidth, error-handling, and reliable control.
" Implemented the command language on the Odyssey IIb AUV in the context of
the behavior-based layered control architecture. Enabled the operator to make
real-time requests for vehicle information during the mission itself.
" Performed field experiments of the supervisory control capability in Monterey
Bay, CA. These experiments provided valuable practical experience in using a
very low data rate communication link for supervisory control, and highlighted
several areas for improvement.
1.3.1 Chapter Preview
The Challenges of Acoustic Communications
The many challenges of communicating through underwater acoustic channels are
discussed as they relate to digital communications, specifically with a moving AUV
in the presence of load co-channel noise sources. WHOI's Utility Acoustic Modem
(UAM) is introduced, and its transmission and reception algorithms are presented.
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Using the Layered Control Architecture for Supervisory Control
A short description of the history of the idea of layered control and the MIT AUV
Lab's implementation of the layered control architecture are presented. A method
for framing operator commands in the context of the behavior-based layered control
architecture is proposed.
SITE '99 Field Experiment Description
Field experiments to test a supervisory control protocol using a hybrid acoustic/RF
communication network in Monterey Bay are described. Experiment infrastructure is
outlined, including such resources as a Shore Control Computer (SCC), a Shore Node
Computer (SNC), Data Repeater Moorings, Utility Acoustic Modems, a Support
Ship, and the Odyssey Ilb AUV Amphitrite.
Experiment Results
The results of field experiments in Monterey Bay are presented and analyzed. The
Message Detection Ratio is examined in the context of the relative position of the
source (the AUV) and the receiver (the data repeater moorings). Contributing factors
to the Data Transfer Rate are examined, including multipath effects and UAM duty
cycle. The Byte-Error Ratio is presented. Anecdotal evidence showing the effective-
ness of the supervisory control capability is presented with examples from specific
missions.
Conclusions and Future Work
The effectiveness of this work is examined, and suggestions are made for needed
improvements and advancements. Possible applications to other areas of research are
presented.
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Chapter 2
The Challenges of Acoustic
Communications
2.1 Introduction
In implementing a successful supervisory control capability for the Odyssey II AUV,
one must recognize and deal with the constricting realities of the underwater acoustic
environment. Low data rate, low signal-to-noise ratio, high propagation latencies,
multiple propagation paths from source to receiver, uncertain connection reliability,
and transmission errors all limit the effectiveness of acoustic communications, and
thus will strongly shape the design of the supervisory control scheme. In this chap-
ter, we discuss the challenges of underwater acoustic communications and describe a
method for robust transmission and reception of acoustic messages in an unfriendly
acoustic environment.
2.2 Modulation Techniques
Digital communication is, at its most basic, the creation and interpretation of two
distinct signals representing binary digits - "one" and "zero". The typical method
of transmitting digital information is by modulating the frequency of an analog sig-
nal. In the simplest method, known as Binary Frequency Shift Keying (BFSK),
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an "alphabet" is formed by associating tones at frequency fi Hz with binary 0
and tones at frequency f2 Hz with binary 1. Using a BFSK modulation scheme,
the string of bits 0111001010000111 would be represented by the sequence of tones
ff2f2f2fff2 ff2 fffff2f2f2. The maximum data rate achievable with this mod-
ulation technique is directly related to the required length of each tone. In general,
the required tone length depends on the frequency difference between tones, the SNR
at the receiver, the estimator algorithm used by the receiver to determine the primary
frequency component in the tone, and the Doppler shift in the perceived frequency at
the receiver due to vehicle motion. A good starting place is to require that each tone
be at least as long as the reciprocal of the frequency difference between tones. If we
used 32 tones in the 12-16 kHz frequency band, each tone would have a bandwidth
of 125 Hz, yielding minimum tone lengths of 8 milliseconds. Lower SNR and higher
Doppler shift require an even more conservative number - 10 to 20 millisecond tone
lengths are common, yielding a raw data rate of 50-100 bits per second with a BFSK
modulation scheme.
A Quaternary FSK scheme involves transmitting frequencies representing bit-
pairs, or symbols. The alphabet for QFSK modulation uses four symbols, as opposed
to two for the method above; each symbol is assigned to a distinct frequency, fi-
f4 (see Table 2.1). Using the QFSK alphabet, the string of bits 0111001010000111
would be represented by the sequence of tones f2f4f1f3f3flf2f4. QFSK modulation
has the advantage of doubling the bit rate (sending two bits for a single tone) but the
disadvantage of requiring twice as many frequencies. Following the previous exam-
ple once more, a 10 millisecond tone length would yield a raw data rate of 200 bits
per second (before application of any encoding techniques or other modifications).
If desired, the modulation technique could be extended to group successively larger
strings of bits, increasing bandwidth at the further expense of bandwidth efficiency.
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Frequency Bit-Pair
fi 00
f2 01
f3 10
f4 11
Table 2.1: A sample QFSK modulation alphabet.
2.3 Signal-to-Noise Ratio
In order to maintain an effective and reliable communication link, the controlled ve-
hicle must transmit with enough power to maintain an adequate signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at the receiver, and vice-versa. The primary factors that must be addressed
when discussing SNR at the receiver are source level, loss due to geometric spreading,
and ambient noise level.
The importance of source level to SNR is relatively simple; the more powerful the
source, the higher the received level, and the higher the SNR. The source level may
not be increased without bound, however - physical limitations of the transducer
material and the phenomenon of cavitation (air bubbles may be created by over-
powerful acoustic sources) impose an upper bound on this solution.
The term geometric spreading refers to the simple fact that acoustic waves propa-
gate from a source in geometrically-defined patterns. Imagine an acoustic wave that
originates as an explosive pulse from a point source in the ocean. The wave front will
expand in all directions, forming a spherically-spreading wave. In an infinite medium,
the wave front would propagate forever with the energy contained in the initial pulse
spreading evenly over an ever-expanding spherical shell. Because of this spreading
effect, the sound pressure at a point anywhere on the wave front is inversely propor-
tional to the square of the distance from the source, P oc -. While not a true loss
mechanism (the original acoustic energy is still present in the shell, its point intensity
is just decreasing), the effect at a more distant receiver is the same - a lower SNR.
Finally, ambient noise level can often be as loud or louder than the received
acoustic signal, lowering the SNR. Ambient noise sources can be natural (crustaceans,
surface waves, seismic), incidental man-made (shipping/fishing traffic), or vehicle self-
23
noise (LBL transducer, motor/prop vibrations).
2.4 Propagation Latencies
Compared with the speed of light in air, sound waves plod along interminably; the
average speed of sound in water is 1.5x10 3 m/s, while the average speed of light is
3x10 8 M/s. Clearly, underwater acoustic communication over any significant range
will involve a substantial round-trip time delay because of propagation latency. This
precludes the implementation of any control scheme that requires the operator to
provide continuous low-level command inputs to the AUV - by the time the operator
reacts to sensor information he receives over the acoustic link, the information is five
to seven seconds old! To make matters even more confusing, the time delay varies,
depending on the distance between the AUV and its acoustic receiver.
To more capably control a vehicle that is seven seconds removed from him, the
operator would prefer to use a supervisory control implementation that incorporates
an inner and an outer feedback loop (see Figure 2-1). In this scheme the AUV's
computer closes the inner feedback loop, robustly and intelligently stabilizing the
vehicle's dynamics and accomplishing pre-planned mission-level goals. The outer
loop is closed by the human operator, who observes the progress of the mission and
issues high-level commands as the situation demands. Returning to the example in
Chapter 1, when the operator determined that the weather at the surface was quickly
becoming too rough to recover the AUV without endangering the ship's crew, he
would, under a supervisory control implementation, send down a command cutting
short the mission and directing the vehicle to rise to the surface. This type of high-
level/low-level control interaction provides a measure of flexibility and agility that
would otherwise be impossible.
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Supervisory Commands
External Information
-------- Human Supervisor -
Acoustic/RF Communication
Sensors
Controller Coto nus*Vehicle Dynamics
Figure 2-1: Block diagram of inner and outer control loops.
2.5 Multipath Propagation
The simple digital modulation techniques described in Section 2.2 implied a recep-
tion algorithm that assumes that the receiver hears the packet of symbol tones
(f2f4flf3f3 ff2f4) in the sequence generated by the transmitter, allowing a faith-
ful reproduction of the original bit stream. This assumption causes no trouble if the
ocean environment looks like the infinite medium of Figure 2-2 (a) because the receiver
only hears sound that travels on the straight-line path between the source and the
receiver - the rest of the sound energy is radiated away in other directions.
The situation is more complicated if the environment looks like the bounded medi-
um of Figure 2-2(b). In this case, the air-sea interface reflects rising sound rays back
down into the ocean. Now, there exists a second path to connect the transmitter
and the receiver - the surface bounce! This is an example of multipath propagation.
Because the surface bounce path is longer than the direct path, a bounced packet
arrives at the receiver delayed by T = rdirec [1-OS OB ] seconds compared to a directi500 COS O
packet, and the receiver hears two instances of the same transmission. The number of
possible bounce paths increases with the introduction of additional reflective barriers:
the sea floor, rock outcroppings, et cetera.
The significance of multipath propagation for digital communications is that the
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receiver's translation algorithm cannot be written assuming that the sequence of tones
it hears is the sequence that was transmitted by the source. The delayed arrival of
the bounced packet can cause two tones to arrive at the receiver at the same time -
the receiver has no way of knowing which of the two tones is the real data and which
should be discarded as an echo. However, the situation may be improved somewhat
by modifying the way the source transmits symbols. If the source waits to transmit
the next tone until all the echoes from the current tone die away, then the receiver
can be guaranteed that all tones it receives in a single time frame correspond to
direct-paths and bounce-paths of a single tone symbol. The receiver algorithm can
again reliably decode the incoming signal - unfortunately, the communication rate is
dramatically slashed due to the necessity to wait for echoes to die away. In the open
ocean, the typical multipath echo duration is approximately 10 milliseconds, but is
close to 100 or 200 milliseconds for acoustically-complicated ocean environments like
the underwater canyons of Monterey Bay. The data rate can easily drop ten-fold if
only this solution is employed. Other methods of combating the effects of multipath
propagation will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.7.
2.6 Communication Link Reliability
As in radio communications, environmental factors can have a significant effect on
the reliability of underwater acoustic communications. In static situations (in which
the transmitter and receiver are unmoving), once operators establish a link it is likely
that it will continue to perform well, short of drastic changes in the environment or
equipment. However, when either the receiver or the transmitter are moving, as is the
case with an AUV, variations in the sound channel properties can make maintaining a
reliable link very challenging. As the AUV strays further and further from the receiver,
the strength of its signal fades at the receiver, making it more likely that ambient
noise will swamp it. As the AUV travels around its underwater environs, local rock
formations or thermal stratifications may interrupt the straight-line propagation path
from the AUV to its receiver, or introduce reflections. The overall reliability of the
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Figure 2-2: Multipath propagation.
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Figure 2-3: Block diagram of transmit and receive signal algorithms for the UAM,
reproduced from ref. 17.
communication link is strongly dependent on both the complexity of the bathymetryl
and on the vertical sound-speed profile2 , but it is almost inevitable that the link will
fail at just the wrong time (don't forget Murphy's Law). The important thing to
understand is that lapses in communication will occur - the success or failure of the
mission depends on how gracefully one deals with these lapses.
2.7 WHOI's Algorithms for Robust Transmission
and Reception
A highly robust signaling method was developed by Dr. Mark Johnson and others at
WHOI for transmission and detection of acoustic messages in acoustically-challenging
environments [17]. While the descriptions may at first seem overly detailed, a good
understanding of the transmission and reception algorithms as well as the factors
driving their design will provide a better understanding of bandwidth and range lim-
'Underwater canyons and "mountainous" terrain will create areas without a line-of-sight connec-
tion between the source and the receiver.
2 Snell's Law says that a sound ray will bend toward depths with a slower speed of sound, possibly
causing a formerly reliable line-of-sight path to fail.
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Word Bit 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
1 parity packet number (8 bits)
2 parity source node i.d. (4 bits) destination node i.d. (4 bits)
3 parity receive packet number (8 bits)
4 parity last source node i.d. (4 bits) number of bad bytes (4 bits)
Table 2.2: UAM Header Structure.
itations, as well as operational use. These algorithms deal effectively with low SNR,
long multipath echo durations, and offer good error-detection and error-correction.
These algorithms have been implemented and successfully exercised on WHOI's u-
tility acoustic modem (UAM) during field experiments in Massachusetts Bay and
Monterey Bay (and elsewhere).
2.7.1 Transmission Algorithm
Each message to be transmitted by the UAM may contain a maximum of 20 bytes (in
this implementation), but the packet of bits that is actually transmitted is more than
twice as long due to encoding and header data. The block diagram of the transmitter
algorithm is shown in Figure 2-3(a).
Only standard ASCII characters are allowed in the packets that the UAM trans-
mits - therefore, the message is re-formatted into 7-bit ASCII format, then truncated
or padded with zeros to 20 characters. The 7-bit characters are made 8-bits bytes by
adding an odd parity bit. Next, a 36-bit header (with fields as shown in Table 2.2) is
pre-pended to the 20 byte message. The header contains an 8-bit number that acts
as a packet identifier (0-255), a unique 4-bit identifier (1-15) for the source UAM, a
unique 4-bit identifier for the UAM for whom the message is intended, the identifi-
er of the last packet received (0-255), the unique 4-bit identifier of the last packet's
source, and the number of byte-errors in the last packet. A destination node of zero
indicates that the message should be decoded by any UAM that detects it. The fields
pertaining to the last received packet (words 3 and 4 in Table 2.2) can help a receiving
UAM decide if it should re-send a particular message, or if the source UAM did, in
fact, receive the last message.
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After reformatting and adding the header, the complete data packet occupies 196
bits. To add the ability to correct errors in the received data, the packet is encoded
with a {23, 12} Golay convolutional error-correction code, allowing the receiver to
correct up to 3 bit-errors per code word. To use the code, the 196-bit packet first
must be reformatted as 17 12-bit words (padding with 8 extra bits). The resulting
data consists of 23 coded bits for each 12-bit input, or 17 23-bit words. This approach
offers a measure of protection against bit-errors, but the algorithm is still vulnerable
to long strings of bit-errors. While no further effort was made to protect against long
strings of bit-errors, the coded words could have been systematically interleaved so
that the least-significant-bits of each of the 17 words become the first 17 bits of the
first word and so on, until all bits have been re-ordered. By interleaving the words,
each bit in a string of consecutive errors would fall in a different code word, so that
as many as 51 consecutive bit errors could be corrected (in this case). That is, if
there were fewer than 52 consecutive bit errors, each original code word would have
three bit-errors or fewer and therefore would be correctable using the {23,12} Golay
encoding scheme.
Finally, a null bit is added to the coded, interleaved packet of 391 bits, and the
packet is re-formatted as 196 2-bit symbols for transmission using the QFSK scheme.
The QFSK modulation scheme assigns each pair of bits to one of four frequencies in a
tone alphabet. The tone alphabet is changed for each pair of bits according to a pre-
calculated frequency "hop" table to provide immunity from the effects of multipath
propagation described in Section 2.5. Since transmission from one UAM to another is
usually not synchronized, a method was devised to facilitate detection and synchro-
nization at the receiver. At the beginning of each packet (header+message data),
the source UAM plays a known sequence of 15 tones, each of about 8 milliseconds
duration. After transmitting the preamble, the UAM waits 270 milliseconds before
transmitting the packet to allow for echoes from the preamble to fully attenuate.
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2.7.2 Receiver Algorithm
The block diagram of the receiver algorithm is shown in Figure 2-3(b). For most of the
time, the detector is the only part of the receiver in operation, continually examining
the received signal for the presence of the preamble sequence. The detector samples
the received signal at 80 kHz and then produces a complex baseband sequence with
a carrier frequency of 14.5 kHz, band-limited to +/-2.5 kHz. The detector separates
the baseband signal into 20 discrete frequency bands, and computes the energy for
each band at a rate of 400 samples per second. A matched filter is used to compare
the energy in each band against the known preamble sequence.
Once the detector identifies the preamble sequence in the baseband signal, a por-
tion of the baseband signal is captured and copied into memory on the UAM. The
time series now in memory on the UAM contains both the preamble sequence and
the 392-bit data packet (header+message data). The receiver decodes the time series
simply by using the known "hop" sequence and the resulting tone alphabet to decode
the hopped QFSK signal. To ensure that the demodulation algorithm is effective,
the location of the first symbol (bit-pair) in the time series of data must be known
with a high certainty. This synchronization function is achieved by using a matched
filter to locate the beginning of the preamble sequence. Once the arrival time of the
first symbol in the preamble is identified, the time series can be split into "frames"
of the same duration as a symbol. The end of the preamble sequence is identified
as 15 frames from the first symbol, and the first symbol of the real data is 270 mil-
liseconds later in the time series (to match the 270 millisecond pause between the
preamble and the data packet). The symbols are then demodulated by applying four
parallel matched filters to each "frame"(one for each base frequency in the tone al-
phabet). After each symbol is demodulated, the matched filters are changed to match
the hopping sequence so that multipath echoes recorded in the time series may be
ignored.
Next, the receiver uses a pre-computed syndrome table for the {23, 12} Golay code
to correct any bit-errors (as far as possible). The final step in the receiver algorithm
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is to perform a parity check on each byte: bytes that do not pass the parity check are
discarded and replaced by the underscore character (_), and a count of parity errors
is kept.
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Chapter 3
Using the Layered Control
Architecture for Supervisory
Control
3.1 Introduction
The layered control architecture was first proposed as a method for controlling fully
autonomous land robots by Rodney Brooks and colleagues at the MIT Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory [6]. Brooks' original formulation was based on his perception
of the reactive way that insects seemed to operate in their environment. When an
ant crawling across a table top runs up against a fruit basket, it turns left or right
to try to go around it. When it "smells" a sugary treat, it follows the scent until it
reaches its target. One would be hard-pressed to argue successfully that ants possess
any higher cognitive ability; yet they thrive, going about the business of feeding
their queen. Brooks proposed that the way ants operate could be represented by a
number of competing survival- and goal-oriented behaviors, simple cognitive units that
generated competing requests to the ant's legs based on the inputs from its antennae
and other sensors. He demonstrated that outwardly complicated activities could be
achieved by arbitrating the outputs of many such low-level behaviors, building from
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simple foundations.
The low computational requirements of a layered control architecture and the
incremental way that layered control programs (missions) can be assembled make it
an attractive alternative for experimental roboticists who often are testing hardware
as they build it [3]. The layered control architecture has been tested on many land
robots and has been adapted successfully for use in underwater vehicles by the MIT
Sea Grant AUV Laboratory [16]. The following two sections will describe the MIT
Sea Grant AUV Laboratory's implementation of the layered control architecture and
discuss its place in the framework of supervisory control.
3.2 Behaviors and Arbitration
The elementary unit of the layered control architecture is a behavior. At its simplest,
a behavior is a software module that maps sensory input to AUV actuator command-
s. Each behavior has the responsibility of trying to accomplish a single task; for
instance, a behavior may be responsible for keeping the vehicle shallower than a cer-
tain maximum depth. If the behavior senses that the vehicle is too deep, it generates
commands to try to drive the vehicle upward. Each behavior's output is in the form
of a setpoint - a desired heading, speed, and/or depth. The following is a list of
several of the behaviors used on the Odyssey AUV's:
* mission-timer - used to monitor the elapsed mission time. If too much time
passes, the vehicle will shut down and float to the surface.
" depth-envelope - used to keep the vehicle shallower than a maximum depth and
shallower than a minimum depth.
" altitude-envelope - used to keep a vehicle from crashing into the bottom.
" ascend - used to bring the AUV back to the surface.
" descend - used to lower the AUV to operating depths.
" setpoint - used to set the AUV on a desired heading, depth, and speed.
34
e waypoint - used to direct the AUV to a specific (x,y) location.
e launch-one - used to drive the AUV below the surface at the start of a mission.
Taken singly, no behavior could direct the AUV to perform all of the functions
necessary for a science mission, but taken together in a scripted mission, the AUV can
be made to carry out outwardly complex missions. An example mission file is shown
in Figure 3-1. A layered control mission may consist of many of the above behaviors,
each of which generates its own commands for the vehicle. In order to handle the
possibility of conflicting commands, a simple method of resolving command conflicts
is employed. Each behavior is assigned a priority at the time the mission is created.
The highest priority behavior has the option of overriding commands from lower
priority behaviors, and thus has final control of the vehicle. Priority is assigned to
each behavior based on the potential consequences of that behavior not accomplishing
its task. With this in mind, behaviors that try to protect the vehicle from dangerous
situations are given higher priority than those that try to achieve a more abstract
goal (i.e. locate an object on the sea floor).
It is useful to categorize behaviors as either goal-oriented or survival-oriented.
Goal-oriented behaviors usually are continuously generating vehicle commands in
an effort to achieve an assigned goal - for instance, a goal-oriented behavior might
try to direct the vehicle to an (x,y) waypoint. A survival-oriented behavior is one
which generally does not generate commands until it senses that the vehicle is in
a dangerous situation (for example, going too deep). For this reason, the survival-
oriented behaviors are usually given a high priority so that they may override goal-
oriented behaviors that threaten the vehicle's survival.
Behaviors can exist in a mission in different states. They can be connected to the
layered control architecture such that they generate commands for the vehicle - this is
referred to as the active state. They can exist in an uninitialized state in which they
do not generate commands until such time as they become active (automatically, or
by input from a user). When a goal-oriented behavior accomplishes its assigned task,
it enters into a complete state. If a behavior encounters an unrecoverable error, it
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Countdown 0
UseThruster 1
UseElevator 1
UseRudder I
UseParosci 1
UseKVHDGI 1
UseKVHDGC 1
UseLBL 1
UseCondTemp I
UseRDI 0
UseModem 1
MonitorModem 5
InitDataFileSize 2
sensor:
sensor:
sensor: uo-mag
behavior: mission-
b.arg:
behavior: ascend 2
b-arg:
b.arg:
b.arg:
b.arg:
behavior: depth.en
b.arg:
b-arg:
b-arg: depth
b.arg:
behavior:
b.arg:
b.arg:
b-arg:
b.arg:
behavior:
b.arg:
b.arg:
b-arg:
b-arg:
behavior:
b-arg:
b-arg:
b.arg:
b-arg:
behavior:
b.arg:
b-arg:
b.arg:
b.arg:
b.arg:
b-arg:
m-posn (m)
mpose (m)
netic-variation(rad)
timer 1
rudder-ang
ascent-ang
spe
end-d
velope 3
max_d
min-d
_cutoff-activ
cutofftd
setpoint 4
setpoint 5
launch-one 6
ele
broadcast 7
headi
d
spe
headi
d
spe
spe
vator-ang
d
tim
start_
dura
xs-d
xs_c
uam-d
uam-c
0
0
0.26529
time(s) 300
le(rad) 0.174533
le(rad) 0.523599
ed(m/s) 1.5
epth(m) 0.8
epth(m) 12
epth(m) 1
e(bool) 1
epth(m) 15
ng(rad) 1.39626
epth(m) 8
ed(m/s) 1.5
time(s) 120
ng(rad) 4.53786
epth(m) 10
ed(m/s) 1.5
time(s) 120
ed(m/s) -1
le(rad) 0.174533
epth(m) 4
eout(s) 120
time(s) 0
tion(s) 43200
elay(s) 10
ycle(s) 15
elay(s) 10
ycle(s) 1
Figure 3-1: Sample mission file, from mission A9925518.
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may enter an error state.
Finally, rather than have the layered control (or planning) level send final, resolved
commands directly to the vehicle's actuators, commands are sent to the vehicle's
dynamic controller. The dynamic controller is a classical automatic PD controller
which receives the setpoints from the layered control level and generates the actuator
commands required to achieve the setpoint. In this way, the vehicle dynamics are
decoupled from the layered control level. The planning level still retains control over
vehicle trajectory, but doesn't have to worry about the complexity of determining
proper actuator settings.
3.3 Modifying a Layered Control Mission
The operator interacts with the vehicle by making changes in the vehicle's layered
control program, or mission. As can be seen in Figure 3-1, each behavior in the
mission has one or more parameters that help define the state the behavior is trying
to reach (or avoid, in the case of survival-oriented behaviors). By changing the value
of these parameters, the operator can have a profound impact on the mission. For
instance, by changing the heading(rad) parameter of one of the setpoint behaviors,
the operator can turn the vehicle in any desired direction. Similarly, if the mission
contained a waypoint behavior, the operator could direct the vehicle to new points of
interest by passing down new values of the goal waypoint.
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Chapter 4
Field Experiments in Monterey
Bay - September, 1999
4.1 Introduction
In September of 1999, the MIT Sea Grant AUV Laboratory conducted joint field
operations with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Scripps Institution of 0-
ceanography, University of Washington's Applied Physics Laboratory, and the Mon-
terey Bay Aquarium Research Institute in Monterey Bay, California. The month-long
experiment was titled the Synaptic Internal Tide Experiment (SITE) and brought to-
gether many diverse resources to study the dynamics of tide-induced internal waves
in Monterey Canyon.
4.2 Experiments in Supervisory Control Using A-
coustic Communications
During the course of the SITE experiment, three days were set aside to conduct tests
of a radio frequency/acoustic communication network that would link a human op-
erator with a sub-surface AUV. The goal of these tests was to explore the utility of a
bi-directional acoustic communication link for the purposes of supervising and con-
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Figure 4-1: Overview of the RF/acoustic communication network implemented in
Monterey Bay.
trolling an AUV from a remote location. The communication network is represented
in Figure 4-1. The communication link allows the operator to do two things: monitor
the vehicle's progress, and send commands to the vehicle to affect the course of the
mission.
A hypothetical exchange between human operator and AUV would occur as follows
(refer to Figure 4-1): the operator, stationed at the Shore Control Computer (SCC),
dispatches an AUV-bound message to the Shore Node Computer (SNC) over an
Ethernet network connection. The outgoing message is received by the SNC and
transferred via radio frequency (RF) RS-232 serial link to one of three data repeater
nodes - moorings situated in Monterey Bay (see Figure 4-2). The mooring receives
the message, encrypts it via the algorithm described in Section 2.7, and broadcasts
it acoustically into the surrounding ocean. When the AUV detects the acoustic
signal, it records and decodes the message, then responds to the command/request
it contains within. A reply by the AUV would follow the same path in reverse.
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Nine vehicle missions were performed in which we gathered data on communication
link performance and from which conclusions can be drawn about the value of the
supervisory control capability.
Many resources were involved in conducting this experiment. These include the
following:
" a shore-based control station, with two computers: the Shore Control Comput-
er (SCC), and the Shore Node Computer (SNC). Each computer also had a
FreeWave RF modem.
" three moorings acting as data repeater nodes, each having an Utility Acoustic
Modem (UAM) and a FreeWave RF modem.
" an Odyssey IIb-class AUV, Amphitrite, outfitted with a UAM and a FreeWave
RF modem.
" a support ship to tend the vehicle, with a Trackpoint acoustic tracking system,
a FreeWave RF modem, and associated personnel.
4.3 Shore Control Station
The shore control station at MBARI consisted of one computer acting as the Shore
Node Computer (SNC) and a second computer acting as the Shore Control Computer
(SCC). Both computers were Dell OptiPlex GX1 models with Pentium II processors
running RedHat Linux 6.0. The SNC's role was to act as the link to the data repeater
nodes deployed in Monterey Bay. The SNC provided this link through a wireless RS-
232 serial connection - a FreeWave RF serial modem. The location of the SNC was
constrained by the maximum transmission range of the FreeWave RF transmitter -
10-20 km depending on antenna arrangement (see ref. 10). However, by using a local-
area-network or a wide-area-network like the Internet, the SNC could act as a server
for computers located in the same room, or around the globe. To demonstrate this
capability, both the SNC and the SCC were connected to the Internet and installed in
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the same room at MBARI. The human operator used the SCC to communicate with
the AUV by transferring all messages to and from the SNC using a standard FTP
protocol. Note that although the FTP transfer was accomplished manually during
the SITE experiment, the process of transferring data between the SNC and the SCC
could easily be automated to enable the use of more sophisticated mission supervision
software.
4.4 RF/Acoustic Data Repeater Moorings
Three moorings were provided by WHOI under sponsorship from the National Ocean
Partnership Program (NOPP). These moorings acted as data repeater nodes in the
communication network, bridging the air-sea interface by converting radio frequency
transmissions to acoustic transmissions, and vice-versa. They provided a way for
data to pass from the AUV's environment to a remote SNC located at the shore-
based control station. Each mooring contained a Utility Acoustic Modem (UAM),
a FreeWave radio frequency (RF) serial modem and an RF power controller. The
FreeWave provided remote access to the UAM from the shore control station - it
allowed data to be passed between the shore station and the mooring as if over a
simple, hard-wired RS-232 serial connection. With appropriate setup, the FreeWave
has a maximum range of 20 miles; however, in this experiment the range was limited
by environmental conditions to about 10 km. The separate RF power controller
allowed the human operator to turn the UAM and the FreeWave RF modem on
and off to save battery power and to reset the mooring. The three moorings were
placed in Monterey Bay at locations that would yield the greatest coverage area
for communications in the area of operation, but remain within range of the Shore
Control Station. In this report, the moorings will be referred to as M2, M3, and M4,
as noted in Figure 4-2.
A source and two hydrophones were included on each mooring for transmitting and
receiving acoustic signals. The source was a 3-ring 18 kHz Datasonics AT18DT; it was
mounted on the base of the mooring housing (about 1.5 m below the water surface).
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Mooring Latitude Longitude
M2 36045.1 N 121053.9 W
M3 36047.6 N 121051.0 W
M4 36047.5 N 121053.7 W
Table 4.1: Location of data repeater moorings in Monterey Bay.
The source had a toroidal beam pattern with a -3dB beam width of approximately
+/- 30 degrees in the vertical plane and was omni-directional in the horizontal plane.
The two hydrophones were Hi-Tech current-mode devices with a sensitive frequency
range of 100 Hz to 30 kHz. One hydrophone was mounted on the lower endcap of the
buoy and the other was resiliently mounted in a cage at various depths for moorings
M2, M3, and M4. Both hydrophones were omni-directional [17].
4.4.1 WHOI's Utility Acoustic Modem (UAM)
The Utility Acoustic Modem (UAM) was also provided by WHOI. It consists of three
circuit boards - a signal input board, a processor board, and a power amplifier board.
The signal input board interfaces with the acoustic receiver, providing a low-noise 10
volt power supply for the hydrophones and filtering the received signal before passing
it on to the analog-to-digital converter (ADC) on the processor board. The signal
input board allows up to four channels of analog data to be filtered and amplified -
for these experiments, the filters have a -3dB passband between 8 kHz and 20 kHz,
and the gain of the amplifier is programmable via the processor board.
The processor board is based on a Texas Instruments TMS320c44 digital signal
processor (DSP), with a clock speed of 60 megahertz. Onboard DC-DC converters
allow the processor board to be powered by an external DC power supply with source
voltage between 6 volts and 20 volts. The processor board uses a number of RS-232
serial ports and programmable input and output lines to communicate with external
equipment, including the signal conditioning board and the power amplifier board.
Onboard 12-bit analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) can be used to acquire up to
four analog input channels simultaneously, with a combined sampling rate of 80 kHz.
The DSP provides switching signals as input to the power amplifier board, which
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Figure 4-2: Locations of data repeater moorings M2, M3, and M4 in Monterey Bay
(marked as NOPP 3,1, and 2).
I I I i &
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subsequently drives the acoustic source.
The power amplifier board receives the switching signal from the DSP and uses
a MOSFET switching technique to provide up to 50 watts of source power from a 6
- 20V power supply. With the Datasonics AT-18DT 3-ring sources installed in the
moorings, the carrier frequency was 14.5 kHz with an operational bandwidth of +/-
2.5 kHz. The output power for the 3-ring source was approximately 170 dB re 1 pOPa.
An operating system developed by researchers at WHOI named Acoustic Modem
Software (AMS) is booted automatically from an EPROM on the processor board
when external power is supplied. AMS provides a text-based interpreted programming
language (similar to MATLAB) that can be used to write software for controlling
UAM operation. AMS also offers a remote host interface that uses a server program
running on a PC to provide access to UAM sub-systems through one of the RS-232
ports. Using the server program, all UAM sub-systems can be tested by running AMS
scripts that reside on the PC, or AMS scripts can be downloaded to non-volatile
memory on the processor board. When the UAM is powered up without the host
server program in operation, AMS scripts in FLASH memory are run automatically.
4.4.2 Accessing the Repeater Moorings
When not being used, the data repeater moorings sat in a quiescent state, with the
UAM powered down and the FreeWave in "sleep" mode. When the operator desired
to talk or listen to the AUV, he would "wake up" the FreeWave by means of a Dual-
Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) tone-dialer (from RadioShack) connected to a RF
transmitter on shore. Once the FreeWave was "woken up", the operator would enter
another DTMF tone-sequence to power up the mooring's UAM. Finally, the operator
would start the remote host interface by executing the server program on the SNC.
The SNC uses the RF RS-232 connection provided by the FreeWave modem to prompt
the mooring's UAM to enter the host interface mode. In the host interface mode,
the UAM has the ability to access the file-system of the SNC over the RF RS-232
serial connection, dramatically extending the range of the host interface access and
allowing the mooring UAM to communicate with the SNC, located many kilometers
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Command Message File Exist?
Send ommad MesageSend Default Message.
Send Comm and M s i esagg. De e d DfutMsae
YES!
No. Decode Message
Place Message In Log.
Figure 4-3: Logical organization of UAM program scripts for the data repeater moor-
ings.
away.
Once the host interface link between the mooring and the SNC was achieved,
the operator would command the UAM to execute program scripts that reside on
the SNC. Written in AMS, these scripts contained the instructions that handle the
encryption, transmission, detection, and decryption of acoustic messages. The scripts
ran in a single thread of execution, cycling through the transmit-receive process about
once every 40 seconds. The flow of operation is outlined in the flowchart in Figure 4-
3).
When the operator wants to send a message to the AUV, he places the data in
a special file on the SCC. To enable truly remote operation, the SCC and the SNC
would share a network-mounted file-system - the SNC and the SCC would share a
local directory via NFS, thus providing a line of communication between the UAM
and the SCC, through the SNC. However, in this implementation, the transfer of files
between the SNC and SCC occurred via manual use of standard FTP utilities.
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UAM 223:74209 no AUV
UAM 223:74336 no AUV
UAM 223:74377 no AUV
UAM 223:74418 no AUV
UAM 223:74545 no AUV
A_D_- -_q_____ P___
UAM 223:74627 no AUV
UAM 223:74668 no AUV
UAM 223:74709 no AUV
UAM 223:74750 no AUV
UAM 223:74791 no% V
UAM 223:74832 no 1UV
00120820000001490*35
00510070000031488* 5
00902490000041461*S0
01292580000101320*34
01682580000091322*3b
02070730000081332*3a
02460760000071419*3b
02850750000081375*35
UAM 223:75185 no AUV
UAM 223:75226 no AUV
UAM 223:75267 no AUV
UAM 223:75308 no AUV
UAM 223:75349 no AUV
Figure 4-4: Log file of acoustic messages received at mooring M3. This log file is
25575326.M3.
During the transmission phase of operation, the UAM first checks the SCC to see
whether this special file containing the operator's message exists. If it does exist,
then the contents of that file are encoded and transmitted by the mooring UAM. If
the file does not exist on the SCC, a default message is automatically transmitted
in its place. After transmitting a message, the UAM samples the incoming acoustic
signal for 15 seconds seeking encrypted data originating from the AUV. If it finds
a valid transmission, the UAM decodes the message and saves it in memory. After
thirty-one iterations of the listen-transmit sequence, the UAM writes a log file on the
SCC containing all of the received messages. An example log file from mooring M3 is
shown in Figure 4-4. This log file contains examples of each possible type of message:
UAM default message (line 1 of text), false detect (line 6 of text), and AUV-generated
(line 13 of text).
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4.5 Vehicle Configuration
For the purposes of these tests the Odyssey IIb AUV, Amphitrite, was fitted with
the standard suite of sensors and batteries1 . Specialized equipment included a Free-
Wave RF serial modem for communicating with the SCC while on the surface2 , and
a Utility Acoustic Modem (UAM) which would act as a transceiver for acoustic com-
munications. Along with the UAM electronics, an omni-directional hydrophone for
detecting transmissions, and a two-ring 18 kHz Datasonics source were installed in
the vehicle. The source had a -3dB beam width of +/- 45 degrees in the vertical
plane, with omni-directional sensitivity in the horizontal plane. The hydrophone was
mounted in the free stream on the nose of the AUV and the transducer was mounted
through the polyurethane hull on the aft underside of the vehicle (see Figure 4-1).
The vehicle's UAM operated in much the same way as the UAMs on the data re-
peater moorings. Instead of communicating with a remote computer over a FreeWave
modem, the UAM is connected directly to a serial port on the AUV's Main Vehicle
Computer (MVC). When the AUV is powered on, the UAM executes the AMS script-
s that are saved in non-volatile memory on the processor board, which immediately
begin running through the transmit/receive loop of Figure 4-3, regardless of whether
or not a mission is running. If a mission is not running, the UAM will broadcast a
default message - Figure 4-4 shows transmissions from the vehicle's UAM that were
logged at data repeater mooring M3. Note the change in message content in the
last third of the log file when the mission began; the message first changed from the
UAM-generated default message to a message generated by the MVC - then, when
the mission ended, it changed back to the default message.
'The AUV's altimeter was not functioning reliably - therefore it was disabled for these missions.
2 Since the AUV has a very low profile on the surface, it was necessary to complete the link with
the SCC by using a third FreeWave RF modem on the support ship as a repeater.
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Figure 4-5: The AUV was deployed from the R/V Shana Rae, a fine vessel run
by Captain Jim Christmann and Angie Christmann of Monterey Canyon Research
Vessels, Inc.
4.6 Support Ship - the R/V Shana Rae
The AUV was launched from the R/V Shana Rae, a fifty-two-foot fishing vessel that
has been converted for full-time use as a scientific research vessel (see Figure 4-5).
A small A-frame on the stern offered a very effective launch and recovery platform.
Engineers and scientists on board the Shana Rae provided support in case of emer-
gencies or loss of RF communication with the vehicle on the surface. A Trackpoint
acoustic tracking system kept the team aware of the vehicle's approximate location
at all times, acting as a backup in case the acoustic communication system failed.
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Chapter 5
Field Experiment Results and
Data Set Descriptions
5.1 Introduction
We ran missions with the Odyssey IIb AUV named Amphitrite on Sunday, Monday,
and Wednesday - 9/12/99, 9/13/99, and 9/15/99. These missions started out very
cautiously, with the vehicle merely broadcasting a periodic message in order to test the
communication network. In the next few missions, we tested the supervisory control
capability by sending commands to the vehicle, though these missions were very
limited in extent and duration in case of problems. Next, we tested the uni-directional
maximum communication range by starting the vehicle near a node mooring and
directing it to travel away from the mooring, again broadcasting the periodic message.
Finally, we pushed the range of the system again, this time attempting bi-directional
communication at the limits of its range. An example mission file can be found in
Figure 3-1.
For each mission, the vehicle creates two log files: the first file contains a detailed
log of all sensor values (polled every 200 milliseconds), and the second, called the
syslog, contains a time-stamped log of higher-level events. For example, the syslog
would include such high-level events as the start or conclusion of behaviors, and
the reception of a command message. Nine of the missions resulted in useful data
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sets; these are listed in Table 5.1 along with general information about each mission.
Several of the missions listed in this table were mainly focused on other scientific
objectives, but the unobtrusive nature of the communications experiments meant
that they could be performed alongside the primary work without disruption. In
addition to the vehicle data files, Table 5.1 lists the associated log file(s) generated
by the data node moorings. These log files contain a record of all detected messages
that were sent by the AUV'. Due to an oversight by the author, messages sent by the
human operator to the AUV were logged in only one instance (mission A9925518). A
written record covers some of these instances, but this omission means that complete
statistics about bi-directional communication performance may not be derived for
every mission.
5.2 Communication Performance
In all nine of the missions, the AUV was broadcasting "heartbeat" information. The
heartbeat contained the vehicle's elapsed mission time, heading, altitude, depth, and
the local water temperature. Not only did this information give us an intimate picture
of the course of the mission, but it also allowed us to collect broad statistics on the
performance of the communication link. Here are some statistics over nine missions:
9 The AUV sent 433 20-byte messages, for a total of 8,660 bytes.
* Of the 433 messages sent by the AUV, 265 were received by the data repeater
moorings - a Message Detection Ratio (MDR) of 61.20%. This number was
lower than expected, but is partly due to operator error - we neglected to log
all messages that the data repeater moorings received.
'Several of the mooring log files cover periods of time during which the vehicle was in the water
but no mission was running. However, the vehicle UAM broadcasts a default message in the absence
of real vehicle data, so these files still contain valuable data. The filenames are: 25576607.M3,
25577856.M3, 25579105.M3, and 25867703.M3
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Mission Start Time Duration Latitude Longitude Mooring
File (hr:min:sec) (sec) (deg., min. N) (deg., min. W) Log File
A9925518 20:45:51 Z 300.39 36047.750 121051.750 25575326.M3
A9925520 22:16:07 Z 411.80 vicinity of vicinity of 25580346.M3M3 M3 25581585.M3
A9925523 22:52:05 Z 483.00 36047.509 121051.653 25584052M3
A9925526 23:25:53 Z 1,229.00 vicinity of vicinity of 25585254.M3M3 M3 25600086.M3
A9925528 23:52:47 Z 1,570.00 vicinity of vicinity of 25600086.M3M3 M3 25601351.M3
25667391.M4
25668815.M4
A9925608 17:56:41 Z 10,052.60 36046.986 121056.004 25670155.M4
25657488.M2
25664193.M2
A9925811 16:46:00 Z 2,129.80 36047.855 121051.772 25862600.M3
25863862.M3
A9925812 17:40:14 Z 2,394.40 36047.840 121051.787 25865080.M3
25866379.M3
25868997.M3
A9925813 19:01:30 Z 1,968.80 36047.874 121053.387 25870449.M4
25871806.M4
Table 5.1: Vehicle mission information, with associated mooring log files.
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Figure 5-1: Sound speed profile from data taken during mission A9925608.
" Of the 5,300 bytes received by the moorings, 5,092 bytes were decoded correctly
- a Byte-Error Ratio (BER) of 3.92%!
" Of the 208 incorrectly-decoded bytes, 143 bytes were successfully identified as
errors while only 65 of the byte-errors continued unflagged.
" The average Data Transfer Rate (DTR) was 3.37 bits/second, or one 20-byte
message every 47.4 seconds.
Figure 5-1 shows a sound-speed profile generated from data taken during mission
A9925608. Note that the sound-speed gradient indicates a downward-refracting a-
coustic environment - i.e. sound rays will tend to bend toward the sea floor, reducing
the sound power level at the receiver. Figure 5-2(a) and Figure 5-2(b) show histograms
of the number of messages the AUV sent with respect to the two-dimensional distance
between the AUV and the mooring and the depth of the AUV. Since the AUV sent
these messages at regular intervals, the figures also show where the AUV spent most
of its time underwater - within two kilometers of the moorings and at 230 meters and
400 meters depth.
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Figure 5-2: Histogram of messages sent by the AUV with respect to depth and
horizontal range. These figures give an overview of where the AUV spent most of its
time underwater.
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5.2.1 Message Detection Ratio
The overall message detection ratio (60.73%) at the moorings was poor, but the
MDR must be viewed in the context of the type of message being transmitted. If
the message carries vehicle position data, and is one of many such messages, then it
may not be a disaster if a few messages are lost. However, if the importance of an
individual message getting to the destination is high (for instance, if the operator is
sending a new heading command to the AUV), then a missed message may mean the
difference between (a) the AUV reversing course and (b) driving into a canyon wall.
If the overall MDR was so low, then we must ask, "Why?". A closer look at
the communications statistics from each mission reveals that, for six of the nine
missions, the MDR was above 90%, and above 87% for seven of the nine missions
(see Appendix A for mission-specific communication statistics). Clearly, something
anomalous happened with the remaining two missions. The two culprit missions
are A9925608 and A9925811, which have a MDR of 27.47% and 53.70% respectively.
Figure 5-3 shows the dead-reckoned trajectories of each mission with overlaid symbols
indicating what the AUV's position was when it sent and received messages. Green
asterisks (*) indicate messages that were successfully received by the data repeater
mooring, and red "x"s indicate messages that were sent by the AUV but never received
(that is, never logged in the mooring data files).
In mission A9925608, the AUV began its descent at 36046.986 N and 121056.004
W, about 3.6 kilometers south-of-west of mooring M4 (see Figure 4-2). From previous
field deployments we expected this to be well within the useful range of the commu-
nications system (see report on communications experiments in Cape Cod Bay [17]).
However, according to the logfile from mooring M4, the mooring didn't receive any
of the AUV's messages until nearly twenty minutes had elapsed. Figure 5-3(a) shows
the AUV's trajectory, beginning in the upper right-hand corner and ending in the
lower left-hand corner. The figure clearly shows that the mooring log file recorded
no receptions until the vehicle was 200 meters deep, at which point, the mooring
suddenly began picking up the AUV's messages with almost 100% accuracy. This is
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(b) Mission A9925811 had an MDR of 53.70%
Figure 5-3: Two missions that had very low message detection rates. The trajec-
tories are marked with green asterisks to indicate shore-bound messages that were
successfully detected by the moorings and red X's to indicate missed messages.
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strange, especially considering that the AUV's horizontal distance from the mooring
had not changed significantly in the twenty minutes it took to reach 200 meters depth.
A closer look at the mooring log file reveals that the very first entry is for a message
sent by the AUV at 1,230 seconds (20 minutes) into the mission. The same pattern
is seen in mission A9925811 - the mooring log file covering this mission begins with
a message the AUV sent at 1,022 seconds into the mission.
These two facts point to a procedural problem on the mooring rather than a com-
munication problem with the UAM's - in this case, the mooring log files and anec-
dotal evidence from the operator suggest that the operator neglected to command
the mooring to automatically log the messages it detected. Based on the high detec-
tion ratio seen in both missions after the operator noticed his mistake and enabled
logging, it can be safely assumed that most of the messages in the first 15-20 min-
utes of missions A9925608 and A9925811 were successfully detected but not logged,
thus artificially lowering the average MDR. Continuing with this assumption, the
re-calculated MDR's for missions A9925608 and A9925811 would increase to 39.01%
and 100%, respectively! Mission A9925608 would still have a low MDR compared to
the rest of the missions, and it will be shown that the majority of the missed messages
can be attributed to steadily increasing distance from the moorings.
Range and Depth Effects
As expected, distance from the AUV to the mooring turned out to be an important
factor in the MDR - the further the AUV is from the data repeater mooring, the less
likely the mooring will hear its transmissions. Figure 5-4 shows that the MDR declined
steadily with increasing distance from the moorings. The MDR was maintained above
80% out to about 4 kilometers, providing a reliable operational footprint of 50.26
square kilometers around each mooring. The furthest communication from the AUV
to any mooring came in mission A9925608 - a transmission was successfully sent from
the AUV to mooring M4, 8.36 kilometers away2 . Communication was not reliable at
2This range is based on vehicle dead-reckoned information. The true number is almost certainly
smaller, as the vehicle was traveling slower than expected due to trim problems.
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Figure 5-4: Relationship of 3-D range to MDR.
that distance, though, as the mooring was receiving about one out of every four
messages the AUV sent. Beyond that distance, no more messages were received.
Clearly, the MDR depends on range from the mooring. But, does it also depend
on the AUV's depth? Figure 5-5 attempts to answer that question by displaying a
two-and-a-half-dimensional histogram relating horizontal distance from the mooring,
the AUV's depth, and the MDR. While this figure is incomplete in the sense that no
data was taken for the co-ordinates where white space exists, it can offer a glimpse at
the co-dependence of depth, horizontal distance, and MDR 3 . At 230 meters, the MDR
was greater than 70% out to a three-dimensional range of 3,500 meters4 . However,
at 400 meters depth, the MDR dropped off much more quickly - by the time the
AUV was just 2,000 meters out, the MDR had already dropped to nearly 50%. The
difference in MDR between the two depths may be a result of the sound speed profile
(see Figure 5-1), but is more likely to be a result of the complicated topography -
3 Figure 5-5 was created using data from only six of the nine missions. Missions A9925520,
A9925526, and A9925528 were not included because the starting co-ordinates of the AUV were
not recorded (and thus, the relative distance to the mooring could not be calculated). Also, the
ambiguous data at the start of missions A9925608 and A9925811 was not included (a total of 36
data points).
4No more data was recorded at this depth - it is possible that the MDR would have remained
above 70% further away from the mooring.
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Figure 5-5: Two-dimensional histogram relating depth and range to MDR. White
space indicates areas where no data exists.
the data at 400 meters was recorded when the AUV was running deep in Monterey
Canyon. The AUV's transmissions lost too much energy in bouncing off rock walls,
or were reflected in useless directions before they got to the data repeater moorings.
As a caveat, this figure obscures the fact that the data presented is a composite of
six missions, each of which took place at different locations. In fact, local topography
can have a dramatic effect on acoustic propagation; the causal relationship between
topography and MDR is not included in this figure.
5.2.2 Byte-Error Ratio
The BER was chosen as a metric rather than the more common Bit-Error Ratio,
due solely to the lack of information about bit-errors - the mooring logfiles only
contained information about whole byte-errors. As such, some information may have
been lost (a single byte-error can result from many combinations of bit-errors), but the
Byte-Error Ratio still offers good insight into the performance of the communication
system.
The BER of 3.92% averages out to less than one byte-error for each of the 265 re-
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Figure 5-6: Distribution of byte-errors in each message.
not included.
Messages with no errors were
ceived messages. However,only 31 out of the 265 received messages actually contained
errors, and each of these messages had an average of 6.7 byte-errors. The byte-error
distribution is shown in Figure 5-6. It is clear that the Golay encoding algorithm was
very effective in guaranteeing a high level of reliability in decryption. In fact, it might
be useful to investigate other methods of encoding that are more bandwidth efficient
- the Golay algorithm doubles the amount of data required to send a single message,
approximately halving the communication rate. Finally, the parity bit on each byte
of data was also helpful in identifying incorrectly decoded data - 143 out of the 208
byte-errors were correctly identified as errors.
5.2.3 Data Transfer Rate
The average DTR was very low, and fairly constant between missions, ranging from
2.90 bps to 4.26 bps5 . The complete message included the 15-tone preamble, 270
millisecond channel-clearing delay, and 196 two-bit symbols. Each message took
'This number only includes the 20 bytes of "payload" data that is included in each message - it
does not include the 36-bit header or the 187 added bits from the Golay encoding algorithm
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approximately 4.3 seconds to transmit. In Monterey Bay, the primary limitations to
the DTR was the presence of strong multipath echoes, and the power requirements
of the UAM hardware.
Multipath Effects
As described in Section 2.7, the transmission and reception algorithms used by the
UAM are based on Quaternary Frequency-Shift-Keying (QFSK). Due to the existence
of multiple propagation paths from the source to the receiver (in the form of direct,
bottom, surface, and canyon-wall bounces), the receiver may easily become confused
if the transmitter is not properly configured. In order to counteract the effects of
the echoes, the transmitter uses a pre-determined "hop sequence" in which the tone
alphabet is continuously varied from symbol to symbol. Once the receiving UAM
detects the preamble sequence in the message, it uses the known hop sequence to
reliably reconstruct the transmitted message.
The maximum data rate was determined by how long multipath echoes were ex-
pected to last in the Monterey Canyon area (100-200 milliseconds), and thus, for
how long each symbol (bit-pair) must be transmitted. Based on the available trans-
mission bandwidth (the 12-17 kHz band was reserved for acoustic communications)
the symbol length was set to 20 milliseconds. This limited the raw data rate to 100
bps'. For comparison, if the multipath duration was 10-20 milliseconds, the symbol
length could have been shortened to five milliseconds, yielding a maximum data rate
of 400 bps7 . Half of the maximum bandwidth was spent on the encryption code, and
22.5% of the remaining bandwidth was used to transmit the header information - in
Monterey, this left a maximum of 38.75 bps for the vehicle data. Power limitations
would cut that number even further.
'Including the 15-tone preamble and channel-clearing delay, this drops to 92.1 bps.
'Remember, the minimum symbol length is determined by the lowest carrier frequency used -
a good rule of thumb is to make the symbol long enough to ensure that it contains 10 or more
wavelengths.
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Power Limitations
During transmission, the UAM used an average of 10 W of power8 . If the source UAM
were to transmit at 100% duty cycle it would quickly drain the batteries, heating up
and possibly destroying the electronics and/or the ceramic source itself. To conserve
power and hardware, it was necessary to limit the transmission duty cycle to a more
conservative value. In Monterey, the preamble, channel-clearing delay, and fully-
coded packet took about 4.3 seconds to transmit, and (on average) the AUV sent
one packet every 47 seconds, yielding an average duty cycle of 4.3:43.1, or 9.1%. The
duty cycle could safely be increased to 4.3:24.37 (15%), and experts advise that, for
safety, the duty cycle should not be pushed higher than 4.3:8.6 (33}%). With the
9.1% duty cycle used in Monterey, the effective DTR (for vehicle data) was limited
to just 3.3 bps! During the remainder of the cycle (approximately 43 seconds), the
UAM spends a maximum of 15 seconds listening for an incoming message packet and
the rest doing computations and idling.
Another problem with the power system is revealed upon closer analysis of the
heading data from mission A9925612, a long run out Monterey Canyon at a depth
of 230 meters. As Figure 5-7 shows, there is a substantial periodic disturbance in
the vehicle's measured heading! After looking at potential sources, the timing of
the disturbances (they come about once every forty seconds) makes it clear that the
perturbations are related in some way to the vehicle's UAM transmissions. It is
hypothesized that the momentary high-current draw by the UAM transducer caused
this heading variation. Obviously, this is undesirable, and the vehicle's power system
design may need some more attention.
5.2.4 Networking Issues
In this network arrangement, the source and the receiver were in no way synchro-
nized. They each ran through the cycle depicted in Figure 4-3 with no attempt at
synchronization with the other. Thus, the chance existed that the two cycles could
8From personal correspondence with Peter Koski of WHOL.
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Figure 5-7: Measured heading from mission A9925528. Note the periodic heading
disturbance, attributable to the power draw required during UAM transmissions.
align such that one UAM would be transmitting just as an incoming message arrived
at its receiver. The incoming message would be completely obscured by the outgoing
transmission. Even less optimal is the fact that the UAM is only listening for 15
seconds out of 47! There seems to be many opportunities for incoming messages to
be missed completely.
5.3 Supervisory Control Performance
The primary goal of this work was to investigate the efficacy of a supervisory control
capability, specifically, one made possible by use of an acoustic data link. This section
covers examples of successful commands sent to the vehicle, which were subsequently
executed, and lists pitfalls that were uncovered relating to operator error, DTR and
propagation delay, and layered control behavior interactions.
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Commanded and Measured Heading: A9925520
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Figure 5-8: The upper plot shows the commanded heading in green and the estimated
heading in blue. Note the step-change in commanded heading at 280 seconds.
5.3.1 Command Execution
The first mission in which we attempted to exercise the command capability was
mission A9925520 (see Figures 5-8 and 5-9). This mission was designed such that the
AUV would drive straight north at a depth of seven meters for 420 seconds before
ascending to the surface. Approximately 280 seconds into the mission, we sent down
a command to change the AUV's desired heading to 180 degrees, due south. The
vehicle's event log has a record of the transmission being received, and the data
file shows that the commanded heading changed as a result of the received acoustic
command - note the step-change in the commanded heading in Figure 5-8. The
vehicle's response to this change in commanded heading can be clearly seen in both
plots of Figure 5-9 - on the plan view, the message reception is marked by a blue
circle in the upper-left, followed shortly by a hard right turn that continues until the
vehicle reaches a heading of 1800 degrees. This clearly demonstrates the capability
to interact with the vehicle while using an acoustic communication link. The key is
that all the high-bandwidth control issues are dealt with on the vehicle - this leaves
the operator with the responsibility to supervise the mission's progress and make
high-level changes.
63
A9925520
2-0
North (in) -100 -60 East (mn)
(a) An isometric view of mission A9925520.
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(b) A plan view of mission A9925520.
Figure 5-9: The first mission successfully demonstrating operator-control of the AUV
(figures not to scale).
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5.3.2 Operator Error
In mission A9925528, the plan was to do much the same as we had in mission
A9925520 - send the AUV north, and then turn it, this time to a heading of 2600
degrees, out the canyon. Unfortunately, in the heat of the moment, and in an attempt
to compose the command and send it in the right transmission time window, I sent
down the new heading in units of degrees, rather than the required units of radians!
Of course a heading of 260 radians corresponds to 137.20 degrees, and so the vehi-
cle took the course shown in Figure 5-10. This kind of error is only to be expected
when testing new systems, but we were lucky that I hadn't made a different typo and
accidentally commanded the vehicle to dive down and crash into the sea floor! This
accident highlights the need for some sort of operator aid, probably in the form of a
Graphical User Interface (GUI), that could help catch errors before they are passed
on to the vehicle.
5.3.3 Operational Limitations Due to Low Data Transfer Rate
and Propagation Latencies
The next mission was A9925526, a mission of approximately twenty minute duration.
This mission was designed as a test to see if the new supervisory control capability
would allow us to perform a mission in more challenging underwater terrain than we
usually allowed - near one of the walls of Monterey Canyon. Monterey Canyon runs
at about 260' and has rock walls that are hundreds of meters high - a very challenging
operational area. The AUV does not carry any sonars for obstacle avoidance (save
the altimeter), so we usually try to ensure that the planned missions keep the AUV
well away from any rock walls. However, by correlating the surface ship's report of
the AUV position (from the Trackpoint system) with the ship's GPS position, we
could monitor how close the vehicle was to the northern canyon wall. We decided
to direct the AUV to drive straight north toward the canyon wall, making sure to
set its maximum mission time low enough that it couldn't reach the wall. However,
if, during the mission, we felt that the AUV could still safely swim north, we could
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(a) Isometric view of mission A9925528.
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(b) Plan view of mission A9925528.
Figure 5-10: Mission showing the effects of operator carelessness. The operator had
planned for the AUV to turn left to 2600, but used the wrong units in the command.
Instead the AUV turned right to 1370.
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periodically lengthen the mission time by using the supervisory link.
The vehicle was continuously tracked with the Trackpoint system and it was also
broadcasting "heartbeat" data every forty seconds, containing the remaining number
of seconds before the vehicle would rise to the surface and shutdown. With this
information, the operator could make a decision to extend the mission or let the
mission expire, based on how close to the canyon wall the vehicle was. Our first
attempt at sending down a command to extend the second setpoint outlined the
difficulties of working with large propagation latencies - since the messages come
only once every forty-fifty seconds, and the message takes approximately 5 seconds
to get to the AUV, we ended up missing the mission cutoff time. Our command to
extend the mission time arrived approximately 2.5 minutes too late!
It became painfully clear that the bandwidth and propagation latencies of the
communication link make it impossible for the operator to really react to information
that he receives over the acoustic link. Instead, the operator must always be antici-
pating what will happen in a few minutes, making predictions, and generally ready
to act before he learns of a problem. However, the acoustic link is still very useful
for intervening in non-emergent situations and for obtaining up-to-date information
about sensor readings, vehicle orientation and status, and mission status! None of
these capabilities would exist without taking advantage of the limited capabilities of
the acoustic link.
5.3.4 Unexpected Layered Control Behavior
Finally, the mission displayed in Figure 5-11 shows what can happen if the operator
does not fully think out the consequences of changing a behavior parameter. In this
case, the AUV was performing a long transect out the axis of Monterey Canyon, and
the science goal dictated that the vehicle needed to stay within 100 meters of the
bottom. In Monterey Canyon, the sea floor slopes away as one gets further from
shore, so the AUV needed to descend as well to stay within 100 meters of the bottom.
Unfortunately, the AUV's altimeter was non-functional, so it could not be relied on
to keep the vehicle away from the bottom. As a compromise, it was decided to have
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Figure 5-11: This mission was a long run out the axis of Monterey Canyon. Note the
unexpected end of mission indicated by the absence of a return-to-surface trajectory.
the vehicle travel at a constant depth, but use the supervisory control capability to
manually lower the vehicle by 10 meters about halfway through the mission.
Examining Figure 5-11 closely, one can clearly see the point at which the AUV
received the message to dive deeper - the trajectory dropped by 10 meters. How-
ever, almost 200 meters later, the mission suddenly aborted, and the vehicle drifted
to the surface. Post-analysis revealed that the depth-envelope behavior caused the
abort when the vehicle ventured below a cutoff depth. This result makes sense with
hindsight, but during the mission, it was far from clear what had caused the problem.
This is an example of how the subtleties of behavior interaction can be problematic,
especially when one starts modifying behavior parameters.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Recommendations
for Future Work
This thesis provided a unique opportunity to examine the usefulness of an acoustic
communication link in enabling supervisory control for an Autonomous Underwater
Vehicle. Acoustic communication is a challenging task due to the dynamic properties
of the link: the locations of the source and/or the receiver are constantly changing;
multiple propagation paths exist, making decryption of data a difficult task; range
and bandwidth are limited by the physics of the medium; power availability is low
due to space constraints on an AUV. However, given all these difficulties, it is still
possible - data transfer links can be supported at up to 2,400 bits per second in un-
complicated, forgiving acoustic environments. Lower performance, but still workable
communication systems can be maintained even in the toughest operating environ-
ments - the depths of Monterey Canyon, where multipath propagation is extremely
strong.
Furthermore, a successful supervisory link with an AUV is possible with the low
data rate link used in Monterey Bay. We demonstrated a remote, wireless command
presence at the AUV from distances of 16 kilometers using a combination radio and
acoustic communication network. We provided to operators, sitting at a desk on
shore, the ability to monitor the AUV's heading, depth, altitude, and the measured
water temperature with sub-minute granularity.
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6.1 Recommendations for Future Work
During the course of this work, several possible avenues of future work were high-
lighted as necessary improvements to the current work, or as newly-enabled by the
current work.
6.1.1 Information Displays
A noticeable lack of functionality in the current work is the absence of any kind of
graphical display to make data coming back from the vehicle more readable. This is
especially important if the operator is attempting to use the data to make informed
decisions about how to change the course of the vehicle's mission! Too often, more
time is spent interpreting textual versions of vehicle data, than is spent deciding what
the vehicle should do next.
A more specialized type of information display is a vehicle dynamics prediction
display. As mentioned before, the low message frequency and high propagation delay
forced the operators to spend a lot of time trying to figure out what the vehicle was
going to be doing five minutes in the future. Instead of the operator trying to predict
those quantities, it would be better if the operator's computer were running a kind
of state estimator (perhaps a Kalman filter) that was continually generating vehicle
state predictions (position, velocity, orientation) based on "heartbeat" information
obtained from the vehicle. This would be similar to the predictive displays used in in
the bridges of super tankers and air craft carriers to aid the pilots of these massive
vessels.
6.1.2 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication and Networking
As untethered, unmanned underwater vehicles become more reliable, robust, perhaps
commercialized, systems, people will start to want to use more than one at a time.
Already, many researchers in ground robotics have performed work suggesting how
multiple robots could cooperate to accomplish a search task more effectively together
than alone. The availability of a proven wireless underwater communication method
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could make inter-vehicle cooperation possible in the underwater arena. Vehicle's
that are scanning the seabed for buried mines and building maps of their immediate
vicinity could share those maps with other vehicles to make the task of autonomous
searching and navigation easier. Or, vehicle's could use the communication link to
achieve formation swimming, thus allowing multiple vehicles to cooperate in large-
scale patterned searches. Finally, much work needs to be done to investigate how
the current acoustic transmission and reception algorithms scale with the addition of
more nodes in the network.
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Appendix A
Tables
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Mission name A9925518
Mooring logfile 25575326.M3
Number of messages transmitted 8
Number of undetected messages 0
Message detection rate 100%
Number of bytes transmitted 160
Number of byte-errors 1
Number of undetected byte-errors 0
4.26 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 37.5 sec
Table A.1: Communication Statistics for mission A9925518.
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Mission name A9925520
25580346.M3
Mooring logfiles 25581585.M3
Number of messages transmitted 8
Number of undetected messages 1
Message detection rate 87.5%
Number of bytes transmitted 160
Number of byte-errors 23
Number of undetected byte-errors 2
3.11 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 51.5 sec
Table A.2: Communication Statistics for mission A9925520.
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Mission name A9925523
25582807.M3
Mooring logfiles 25584052.M3
Number of messages transmitted 12
Number of undetected messages 0
Message detection rate 100%
Number of bytes transmitted 240
Number of byte-errors 15
Number of undetected byte-errors 3
3.98 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 40.25 sec
Table A.3: Communication Statistics for mission A9925523.
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Mission name A9925526
25585254.M3
Mooring logfiles 25600086.M3
Number of messages transmitted 30
Number of undetected messages 1
Message detection rate 96.67%
Number of bytes transmitted 600
Number of byte-errors 26
Number of undetected byte-errors 3
3.91 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 41.0 sec
Table A.4: Communication Statistics for mission A9925526.
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Mission name A9925528
Mooring logfiles 25600086.M3
Number of messages transmitted 36
Number of undetected messages 2
Message detection rate 94.44%
Number of bytes transmitted 720
Number of byte-errors 57
Number of undetected byte-errors 6
3.67 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 43.6 sec
Table A.5: Communication Statistics for mission A9925528.
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Mission name A9925608
25667391.M4
25668815.M4
Mooring logfiles 25670155.M4
25657488.M2
25664193.M2
Number of messages transmitted 182
Number of undetected messages 130
Message detection rate 28.57%
Number of bytes transmitted 3,640
Number of byte-errors 2,634
Number of undetected byte-errors 14
2.90 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 55.2 see
Table A.6: Communication Statistics for mission A9925608.
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Mission name A9925811
Mooring logfile 25862600.M3
Number of messages transmitted 54
Number of undetected messages 25
Message detection rate 53.70%
Number of bytes transmitted 1,080
Number of byte-errors 521
Number of undetected byte-errors 7
4.06 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 39.4 sec
Table A.7: Communication Statistics for mission A9925811.
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Mission name A9925812
25863862.M3
Mooring logfiles 25865080.M3
25866379.M3
Number of messages transmitted 57
Number of undetected messages 5
Message detection rate 91.23%
Number of bytes transmitted 1,140
Number of byte-errors 137
Number of undetected byte-errors 14
3.81 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 42 sec
Table A.8: Communication Statistics for mission A9925812.
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Mission name A9925813
25868997.M3
Mooring logfiles 25870449.M4
25871806.M4
Number of messages transmitted 46
Number of undetected messages 4
Message detection rate 91.30%
Number of bytes transmitted 920
Number of byte-errors 154
Number of undetected byte-errors 16
3.74 bits/sec
Data rate or
one msg. per 42.8 sec
Table A.9: Communication Statistics for mission A9925813.
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Appendix B
List of Acronyms
ABE Autonomous Benthic Explorer
ADC Analog-to-Digital Converter
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
BER Byte-Error Ratio
bps bits per second
BFSK Binary Frequency-Shift-Keying
DTMF Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
DSP Digital Signal Processing
DTR Data Transfer Rate
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
MBARI Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute
MFSK Multiple Frequency Shift Keying
MDR Message Detection Ratio at the mooring
MVC Main Vehicle Computer
NOPP National Ocean Partnership Program
PD Proportional-Derivitave
PPM Pulse Position Modulation
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QFSK Quaternary Frequency Shift Keying
REMUS Remote Environmental Monitorint UnitS
ROV Remotely-Operated Vehicle
RPC Remote Procedure Call
SCC Shore Control Computer
SNC Shore Node Computer
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
UAM Utility Acoustic Modem
WHOI Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
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